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The incidence of taxes is a fundamental question in public economics.
The study of tax incidence is, broadly defined, the study of the effects of
tax policies on the distribution of economic welfare. It bridges both the
positive and normative aspects of public economics. Studying tax incidence
requires characterizing the effects of alternative tax measures on economic
equilibria. Tax policy decisions are based, at least in part, on their
effects on the distribution of economic welfare. It is, therefore, little
wonder that the study of tax incidence has attracted the attention of economic
theorists, at least since Ricardo's discussion of taxes on rent. Certainly
the study of the incidence of different types of tax policies in various
economic environments continues to be an area of active research.
The distinctive contribution of economic analysis to the study of tax
incidence has been the recognition that the burden of taxes is not necessarily
borne by those upon whom they are levied. In general, the introduction of
taxes, or changes in the mix of taxes, changes the economy's equilibrium.
Prices of goods and rewards to factors a'e altered by taxes. In assessing the
incidence of tax policies, it is necessary to take account of these effects.
Changes in prices can lead to the shifting of taxes. Thus, for example, a tax
on the hiring of labor by business may be shifted backwards to laborers in the
form of lower wages or forward to consumers in the form of higher prices. The
measurement of tax incidence is not an accounting exercise; rather it is an
analytical characterization of economic equilibria under alternative
assumptions about taxation.—2—
Tax incidence -is a part of the very broad study of how exogenous
interventions affect the economy and is necessarily predicated on a theory
of economic equilibrium. As such, tax incidence conclusions are critically
dependent on which theory of economic equilibrium is chosen. We follow the
main thrust of the literature in studying the effects of taxes in competitive
economies where markets clear. This assumption has been adopted extensively
not so much for its realism as because of the absence of widely accepted,
fully articulated alternatives to the competitive paradigm.
Even maintaining the assumption of perfect competition and market
clearing, the question of tax incidence has been approached in many ways.
This is a consequence of both the richness of the problem and the generality
of models of competitive equilibrium. The incidence of a wide variety of tax
instruments ranging from estate taxes, to excise taxes, to the corporate tax
is of interest. Incidence has many dimensions that have attracted attention.
These include the effects of taxes on the distribution of factor incomes, the
degree of income inequality, the welfare of members of different generations,
and the consumers of different products. Given the choice of model and the
issue of concern, tax incidence results are generally ambiguous without
additional restrictions on the precise nature of preferences and technology.
As Arrow and Hahn (1971) emphasize, without further assumptions, virtually all
comparative static experiments have ambiguous effects in the standard model of
competitive equilibrium.
Our survey of the tax incidence literature is organized as follows. The
first section reviews traditional approaches to the study of tax incidence.
These include partial equilibrium analyses and studies based on the judgmental-3-
allocation of tax burdens to different population groups. A number of issues
in the tax incidence literature, including the proper alternative to be
considered in defining the incidence of a tax and the dimensions along which
incidence should be measured, are also discussed. The second section
introduces the general equilibrium analysis of tax incidence. A general
equilibrium approach is necessary to treat the incidence of taxes which impact
on large parts of the economy. The sensitivity of judgments about the
incidence of taxation to a large number of elasticities is stressed.
The third section takes up the incidence of taxes in open economies.
These may be thought of either as regions within a single country, or as
different nations. We show that the incidence of alternative taxes hinges on
what is assumed mobile. We also discuss the controversial question of the
incidence of local property taxes.
The fourth section places the analysis of tax incidence in a dynamic
context. This step is important for several reasons. The long run incidence
of any tax change will depend critically on its effects on capital
accumulation and the resulting marginal productivities of capital and labor.
The short run burdens borne by the owners of productive assets will depend, in
large part, on the instantaneous revaluation of these assets arising from both
current and anticipated future tax changes. Perhaps most importantly,
studying the intergenerational incidence of tax changes (the tax burden on
successive generations) requires a dynamic model.—4-
I. PRELIMINARIES
A.The Partial Equilibrium Analysis of Tax Incidence
Many of the fundamental principles of tax incidence may be illustrated in
the simplest partial equilibrium setting. We therefore begin by considering
the partial equilibrium analysis of an excise tax on a product. As discussed
below, for partial equilibrium analysis to be appropriate, it is necessary
that the product in question have a market that is small relative to the
entire economy. Theanalysisis depicted in Figure 1.In the absence of
taxation, equilibrium is attained where supply equals demand and the
equation:
(1.1) D(p) =S(p)
is satisfied. Now consider the introduction of an excise tax at rate T.If
the tax is collected from buyers, the new equilibrium will satisfy the
condition that:
(1.2) D(p!÷T) =S(p')
while if the tax is collected from sellers, the new equilibrium will satisfy
the condition that:
(1.3) D(p") =S(p"—T)
Comparing equations (1.2) and (1.3), it is clear that the determination of the
equilibrium quantity, the price paid by consumers, and the net of tax receipts
of producers does not depend on which side of the market the tax is levied;p
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i.e., Pr' =p'+T.Diagramatically, the imposition of a tax can be analyzed
as a shift in the demand curve facing suppliers, as in Figure 1, or as a shift
in the supply curve facing consumers. The resulting equilibrium is the same
in both instances. This principle, that the incidence of a tax does not
depend on which side of the market it is levied, carries over to much more
general contexts and underlies the general equilibrium tax equivalence results
that we discuss below.
It follows immediately from this tax equivalence principle that the
ultimate incidence of a tax cannot be assessed simply by looking at here the
tax is proximately levied. For, as we have seen, shifting the tax assessment
between consumers and producers has no real effects. The real equilibrium is
invariant to whom the government requires mail in the tax payment.
In order to examine the incidence of an excise tax we begin by
characterizing the change in equilibrium that results from the imposition of
the tax. For convenience we think of the tax as being collected from
consumers. Differentiating (1.2) yields:
14 42____
dT
where 0' =dD(p)and s' =dS(p)More conveniently, we can write: dp dp
(1 5) =
d-rsD
where 0 represents the elasticity of demand, andirepresentsthe elasticity
of supply. At this point we are ready to assess the incidence of an excise-6-
tax. Consider the changes in consumers' and producers' surplus arising from
introducing a small tax. For a small tax the change in consumer surplus
equals, minus the change in the consumer price times the initial quantity
demanded, and the change in producer surplus equals the change in the producer
price times the initial quantity supplied. Hence, we have:
(1 6
dCs _715D(p)
di -sD
and
dPs______ (1.7) di -sD
where Cs and Ps represent, respectively, consumers' and producers' surplus.
Note that for a small tax change starting with no tax, minus the sum of the
changes in consumers' and producers' surplus equals the tax revenue since
D(p)=S(p), and the change in tax revenue equals dTS(p). In terms of Figure 1
the change in consumer surplus is the area abcd, and the change in producer
surplus is dcef. For very small taxes the sum of these taxes is essentially
abef, the tax revenue.
Equations (1.6) and (1.7) illustrate a fundamental principle that will
recur frequently in our discussion of tax incidence. Taxes tend to be borne
by inelastic suppliers or demanders. It is instructive to consider the
limiting cases of (1.6) and (1.7).If demand is completely inelastic or
supply perfectly elastic, consumers will bear the entire burden of an excise
tax. Conversely, if supply is perfectly inelastic or demand is perfectly
elastic, the entire excise tax will be borne by suppliers. More generally,-7--
taxes are borne by those who can not easily adjust. The greater buyers'
abilities to substitute other commodities for the taxed commodity, the greater
their ability to shift taxes. Likewise, if producers have no fixed factors
and can leave an industry where taxes are being levied, their supply curve is
perfectly elastic and the tax must be borne by consumers. For if sellers were
forced to bear the tax, they would earn a sub-normal rate of return leading
then to cease production. Hence, in the new equilibrium producers receive the
same price for producing as in the old equilibrium, while the price paid by
consumers r-ises by the full amount of the tax.
While this analysis accurately describes the effects of introducing an
excise tax in a small market where there are no pre—existing distortions, it
-is difficult to extend to other cases. In general, shifts in the demand curve
such as would be caused by a tax change will be associated with changes in the
demand for other products. This will alter their prices leading to changes in
factor prices which will affect the position of both the supply and demand
curves in Figure 1.In considering taxes which affect a large part of the
economy, it is therefore necessary to adopt a general equilibrium perspective
rather than the partial equilibrium view taken above. Two principles which
emerge from this partial equilibrium analysis will remain valid. First, tax
incidence does not depend on which side of a market the tax is assessed.
Second, taxes will be shifted by those agents and factors that are more
elastic in supply or demand.
B.Methodological Issues
Before turning to the general equilibrium analysis of the effects of-8-
alternative tax instruments, it is useful to comment on several important
methodological issues which arise in the study of tax incidence. The first
question that arises is how should incidence be measured. A natural, but
difficult to implement answer is that the incidence of a tax change can be
assessed by looking at the compensating variation associated with the tax
change for each participant in the economy. As discussed in detail in Alan
Auerbach's contribution to this handbook (Chapter 2), the compensating
variation provides a dollar measure of the impact of a given tax change on
individual economic welfare. It equals the additional income needed to
restore the consumer to his or her initial utility level given a change in
consumer prices. The compensating variation may be computed as follows:
(1.8) CV =e(q1,u0)
-
e(q0,u0)
where e( )isthe minimum expenditure function, which depends on the consumer
price vector q, and the initial utility, u0. In (1.8) q1 is the post tax
price vector, and q0 is the pre-tax price vector. Alternatively, similar
measures discussed by Auerbach, such as the equivalent variation that replaces
in (1.8) with the post tax utility level, may be used in assessing tax
reforms.
While the computation of the compensating variation associated with a
tax change for each affected person reveals its incidence, actual compensating
variations are not explicitly calculated in most theoretical or empirical work
on tax incidence. In part, this is because of the difficulty involved in
specifying individual expenditure functions. It is also due to the fact that
most studies of tax incidence focus on the effects of taxes on different-9-
classes of individuals. Studies concerned with vertical equity focus on the
differential effects of taxes on after tax incomes of persons with varying
levels of pre-tax income. Much of the literature studies the effects of
alternative tax policies on the after tax payments to different factors. This
is thought to indicate how different tax changes affect workers, capitalists,
land owners, etc. Other dimensions along which incidence is sometimes
measured include region and date of birth. Intergenerational issues have been
a particularly active subject of research in recent years. Studies of
incidence along all these dimensions are best thought of as providing
indications of salient features in the distribution of compensating variations
associated with alternative tax policies.
In the partial equilibrium incidence calculation described above no
attention was devoted to the question of what is done with the revenue raised
by the excise tax. Specifying the use of the revenue was unnecessary given
the partial equilibrium character of the analysis. Implicitly it was assumed
that the revenue was not spent on the taxed good, but no more needed to be
specified. In general equilibrium the effects of a tax change will depend on
whether the tax is used to finance changes in government spending, rebates to
consumers, or changes in other taxes. Thus the incidence of a tax cannot be
considered in isolation. Its incidence must be assessed along with a feasible
disposition of tax revenue. This has led to the development of several
different incidence concepts in the literature. The term differential
incidence is used to describe comparisons of the incidence of different tax
instruments that raise the same amount of revenue. The term balanced budget
incidence is used to describe the effects of increased government spending-10-
financed by increases in the tax under consideration. No single concept is
uniformly appropriate in assessing the incidence of a tax. The appropriate
assumption about the use of tax revenue will depend on the nature of the tax
reform being studied. In discussing tax incidence, however, it is critical to
be clear about the nature of the experiment being considered.
C. Empirical Incidence Evaluations
Analytical work on tax incidence in various economic models of the type
surveyed in this chapter has been complemented by empirical studies that have
sought to evaluate the overall incidence of the tax system. Major studies of
this type include Pechman and Okner (1974), Musgrave and Musgrave (1976), and
Pechman (1984). Their approach and that of other authors working -in this
tradition is to postulate an incidence for each type of tax, and then use
microdata on individuals to calculate the distribution of total tax burdens by
income class. The striking finding of all these studies is that despite the
apparent progressivity of the income tax, the share of income paid in taxes
does not rise with income. The total tax system appears to be roughly
proportional over much of the income range.
A number of problems have been raised with empirical incidence studies of
this sort. Perhaps most serious is the need to make assumptions about the
ultimate incidence of various types of taxes. As our subsequent analysis will
make clear, this is very difficult to determine. And conclusions about the
effects of taxation on the distribution of income can be no better than the
judgments about the incidence of individual taxes on which they are based.
Devanajour, Fullerton, and Musgrave (1981) do, however, provide some evidence—11—
suggesting the results of judgmental studies are fairly close to those of full
scale general equilibrium simulation exercises of the type described below.
A related problem with these incidence evaluations -is that they measure
taxes collected by the government from various income classes, but these tax
collections may differ substantially from the tax burdens that are imposed on
them. A good example is provided by the municipal interest exclusion in the
United States. Taxpayers in high tax brackets tend to hold municipal bonds
which are tax—free. But these bonds have lower yields than taxable bonds.
Hence high bracket tax payers bear a burden imposed by the tax system even
without transferring revenue to the government. Similar reasoning applies to
investments -in any tax favored activity.
An understanding of the distributional impact of the tax system must be
predicated on an understanding of its general equilibrium effects. We now
turn to this question.
II. STATIC GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODELS OF TAX INCIDENCE
Static models of tax incidence take the economy's aggregate supplies of
productive factors, such as physical capital, as given, and consider changes
in equilibrium prices arising from commodity and factor taxes. While ignoring
the -intertemporal issue of human and nonhuman capital formation, static models
can provide considerable insight into the incidence of taxation in the short
run, i.e., before capital stocks have adjusted to changes -in after tax prices.
In addition, many of the conclusions of static tax analysis can be directly
applied to the case of long run dynamic incidence.—12—
In contrast to the implicit model underlying Figure 1, in which producers
and consumers of goods are distinct agents, this section examines models in
which all agents have identical consumption preferences, i.e., the producers
(actually the owners of productive factors) are also the consumers. Hence,
interest shifts from the question of whether producers or consumers bear the
burden of a tax to the question of the division of the tax burden among the
owners of productive factors.
As one would expect, the aggregate supply elasticities of and demand
elasticities for particular factors play key roles in the analysis of the
incidence of uniform commodity and factor taxation. In the case of
differential commodity taxes or industry-specific factor taxes the structure
of industrial demands for factors is of great importance for incidence; the
ultimate incidence of industry-specific factor taxes depends not only on the
demand conditions in taxed industries, which will typically attempt to reduce
their demand for the taxed factor, but also on the demand conditions for that
factor in untaxed industries which will absorb factors released from the taxed
sector.
A. Tax Incidence in a One Sector General Equilibrium Model
1. Factor Taxes
A one sector general equilibrium model is useful for highlighting
several of the main results in static tax incidence analysis. Let X be the
economy's single commodity, which is produced using labor, L, and capital, K.
The linear homogeneous production function is given by:
(2.1) X =F(K,L)
where FL >0,and FK >0.The supply of capital, K, is totally inelastic in—13—
the short run, but the supply of labor is positively related to the real wage,
W/P, where W is the wage rate, and P is the price of good X:
(2.2) L =L(W/P),
where Lt(W/P) > 0.In competitive equilibrium, marginal revenue products are
equated to factor costs, giving:
(2.3) PFL(K,L) =W
(2.4) PFK(K,L) =r,
where r is the rental rate on capital. Equating labor supply and labor demand
in (2.3) determines the equilibrium real wage and the equilibrium level of
labor; i.e.:
(2.5) FL(L(W/P),K) =W/P
Given the equilibrium level of L, r/P, the real rental on capital is deter-
mined by (2.4).
Consider first the incidence of a tax at rate T on the rental of capital.
Equation (2.4) becomes:
(2.4') PFK =r(1+T)
Since neither the supply nor the demand for labor are affected by this tax,
the equilibrium values of W/P, L, and FK are unaffected. Capital, in this
case, bears the full burden of the tax, since its real rental, r/P, falls from
FK to FK/1+T. The change in the real rents received by owners of capital is-14-
(FK -((FK/1+T))Kwhich equals T(rK/P), the real taxes paid on the rental of
capital. The entire incidence of the tax falls on capital since it is
perfectly inelastic in supply to the economy and since it is taxed at the same
rate in all its uses, which in this case is a single use, namely the
production of X.
The results are different in the case of taxing elastically supplied
labor at rate T. Producers now equate the marginal revenue product of labor
to the after tax cost of hiring labor, i.e.:
(2.3') =W(1+T)
The demand and supply relations, equations (2.3') and (2.2) respectively,
determine the new equilibrium wage. The percentage change in W/P arising from
an increase in T, evaluated at T= 0, is given by:
(W/P) D aT —_______
W
—
S D
() T -fl
where is the (positive) elasticity of labor supply, and is the (negative,
since FLL < 0) elasticity of labor demand. Evaluated at T =0,the change in
real tax revenue (T()L) is simply ()L. The marginal losses in rents to labor,
(W/P) . a(r/P) . L,and to capital, •K,expressed as a ratio of the marginal
tax revenue, ()L, are given by:
(W/P)
8T
L
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Notethat the two ratios sum to -1, indicating that the full incidence of the
tax falls on either capital or labor.
If labor supply -isperfectlyinelastic, r =0,labor bears the full
burden of the tax; i.e., the right hand sides of (2.7) and (2.8) are -1 and 0,
respectively. This result also holds if the demand for labor is perfectly
elastic (riD =cc). Atthe opposite extreme labor may be perfectly elastic in
supply (riS =cc), orthe demand for the labor may be perfectly inelastic
(n0= 0),in which case capital bears the full burden of the tax. Note that
capital always bears some burden of the tax provided S 0 and cc.In
general, the larger the supply elasticity and the smaller the demand
elasticity, the larger will be the share of the tax burden shifted to
capital.
The elasticity of labor demand is related to the degree of
substitutability between capital and labor. Equation (2.9) expresses this
relationship for the case of a linear homogeneous production function, where a
is the elasticity of substitution of capital for labor with respect to
increases in the wage—rental ratio, and is capital's share of output
(FKK/F):
(2.9) =- a/AK
As a -.cc, i.e.,as capital and labor become closer substitutes in
production, -cc Alternatively,as a -+0and capital and labor approach-16-
perfect complementarity,
-0.Intuitively, when a =, capitaland labor
are perfect substitutes; hence, their after tax user costs to competitive
firms must be identical, and W(1+T) =r.But, assuming constant returns to
scale, the production function in this case is of the form F(K,L) =a(K+L),
where the constant a equals both FK and FL. Since FK =a=r/P=(W/P)(1+T),
W/P falls by the full amount of the tax.If, on the other hand, a =0,firms
view their input as a fixed combination of capital and labor. From their
perspective a tax on labor is identical to a tax on capital as long as it
raises the cost of the fixed capital and labor input bundle by the same
percentage. Since any reduction in the real wage, W/P, received by labor will
reduce the supply of labor (assuming L'(W/P) > 0) and make part of the capital
stock redundant, the equilibrium involves no change in W/P and a fall in r/P
such that the loss to capitalists in real rents equals the tax revenue.
2.Commodity Taxation
A proportional tax at rate T on the consumption of good X creates a
divergence between the price, P. paid by the consumer and the price P/1+T
received by producers. With a consumption tax the factor demand conditions
are written:
(2.4")(j-) FK(L(W/P),K) =r
(2.5") FL(L(W/P),K) =W
Multiplying (5') and (6') by (1+T) reveals that a proportional consumption tax
is structurally equivalent to a uniform proportional tax on factor inputs. A—17--
further equivalence result can be demonstrated by rewriting (2.5') and (2.6')
in terms of the producer price q, where q =P/1+T,and the tax rate T*, where
=T/1+T:
(2 4"')q FK(L(W(1T)),K) =r
(2.5"')qF(L(lT*)),K) =w
Equations(2.5"') and (2.6"') describe the identical tax structure as a urHform
proportional income tax at rate i-* on wages and capital rents; here r is the
pretax return to capital paid by firms, while r(1_T*) is the post (income) tax
return to capital.
The equivalence in a static model between a uniform consumption tax1
a uniform tax on factor returns (a value added tax), and an income tax is a
general result that applies independent of the number of sectors and factors
(Break (1974), Musgrave (1959), and McLure (1975)).1
Using (2.4") and (2.5") the incidence of the commodity tax expressed as a
fraction of real marginal tax revenues (X) is:
a(W/P) L D
T =°LS D' and
fl
(2.10)
3(r/P)K S 8T _______
X
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where is labor's share of output. If =0or =capital and labor
bear the burden of the tax -in proportion to their respective shares of output.
If =0or T1S =, capitalbears the entire burden of the tax.—18-
B.Tax Incidence in a Two Sector General Equilibrium Model
The static two sector general equilibrium model permits the analysis
of sector-specific factor taxes. Harberger's (1962) seminal analysis of the
incidence of the corporate income tax focused attention on the elasticity of
supplies of domestically mobile factors to particular industries, with such
mobile factors able to switch industries in an attempt to avoid taxation. The
research also identifies industry-specific factor demand conditions as
critical for determining the incidence of a sector-specific factor tax. As
indicated in the discussion of one sector factor tax incidence, factor demand
elasticities are closely related to elasticities of substitution in
production.
A variety of taxes can be analyzed in this model. A thorough review -is
presented in McLure (1975) who also discusses a number of tax equivalence
propositions. Since both capital and labor are assumed to be inelast-ically
supplied, the incidence of a general factor tax is trivial. It is borne
entirely by the taxed factor. The incidence of excise taxes on one of the
commodities is more complex and -is considered below. We focus on the case of
a sector-specific tax such as the corporate tax. The two sector general
equilibrium model is the simplest framework in which such a tax can be
investigated.
The two sector general equilibrium model highlights the wide range of
theoretically possible effects of a tax even in a very simple setting. A tax
may actually benefit the taxed factor, or the taxed factor may lose more than
the amount of tax revenue collected. Intermediate outcomes are also possible.-19-
1. Assumptions of the Model
The two factor, two sector model examined by Ilarberger assumes that
economy-wide supplies of the two factors, capital and labor, are perfectly
inelastic, but that capital and labor are perfectly mobile between sectors.
The two industries are perfectly competitive, and the production functions of
both industries exhibit constant returns to scale. The assumption that
workers, owners of capital, and the government have identical homothetic
preferences ensures that the redistribution between the three demanders of
goods arising from the sector specific factor tax has no impact on the
aggregate demands for the two goods. The analysis thus abstracts from changes
in the relative demands for the two goods that could arise if workers',
capitalists', and the government's preferences differ.
2. The Model
Denote the two industries as X and Y. The constant returns assumption
permits the production function to be written in intensive form:
(2.11) X =Lf(k)
=Kf(k)/k
Y =
Lyg(ky)
=
Kyg(ky)/ky
where L and Ls, are, respectively, the quantities of labor used to produce
goods X and V. and k and k are the respective capital-labor ratios in
industries X and V. The function f( )expressesthe ratio of output of X to
Lx, and g( )is,similarly, output of V per worker in industry V. The respec-
tive economy-wide supplies of labor and capital, Land K, must sum to their
respective demands:-20-
aiX + a1Y =L
(2.12)
akXX + akYY =K,
where aix, akX,a1. and akY are input-output coefficients and are implicitly
defined in (2.11). The equalities, required by competition in factor markets,
between marginal revenue products and post tax factor costs may be written as:
w+(r+i )k r+
- kxx kx .'x f
—f'
w+rk
p =
y g g'
where and P,, are the respective prices of goods X and V1 W and r are the
respective net rentals to labor and capital, and Tkx is the tax on the rental
of capital in the X industry.
The assumption of identical homothetic preferences of workers, capital-
ists and the government implies that aggregate demands can be written as:
(2.14) X =m(P/P)
•I
=x"y
where I is total disposable income of the private sector plus the government's
tax revenues, i.e.,
(2.15) I =wi.+ rK + TkXKx
The expressions (2.12), (2.13), and (2.14) provide eight equations in eight
unknowns, X, V. w, r, k. and Ps,,.One of these equations is, however,
redundant implying that one can only solve for relative prices. Specifically,—21-
the expressions in (2.14) satisfy:
(2.16) p x+P V =I=wL.+ rK + T K
x y kxx
The first equality in (2.13) implies, P,<X =wL>+ (r+TkX)KX. This expression
and (2.16) imply: P,, =(w4-rk)/g,
the third equation in (2.13).
3.The Incidence of a Tax on Capital in Industry X
Following the derivation in Atkinson and Stigiitz (1980), which employs
Jones' (1965) technique of considering "equations of change," one can reduce
the eight equations in (2.12), (2.13) and (2.14) to three equations in the
percentage change in the three ratios: X/Y, x'y' and w/r. Let z denote the
proportional change in a variable z. From (2.13) we have P><f' =Pg'+ Tkx
Totally differentiating this expression yields:
g"k f"k dT
(2.17) x -Py
=
gYk -f,xk + rkX
w f-f'k wg-g'k
Expression (2.13) also implies = X
and =
g'
'"•Total
differentiation of these expressions gives:
f'O .f'dT wx wxkx
(2.18) k =—f"k
(w—r) —f"k r
and
k =-
g"k
(w-r),
where Eand 0are the respective labor shares in producing X and V wx wy
(e.g., 0wx =(f_f'k)/f).Equations (2.17) and (2.18) imply:-22—
dTk
(2.19)P -P=(0 -9)(w-r) +0
X
x y wx wy rxr
In (2.19) 6rx is capital's cost share in X. The equation indicates that the
relative price of X rises with increases in the wage-rental ratio if labor's
cost share in X exceeds its cost share in V.
We next consider percentage changes in factor demands. Total dif-
ferentiation of (2.12) yields:
(2.20)lx +X)X1
+1y'ly =0
(akX +X)AkX+
(akY
+''ky
0,
where Alx 11y is the share of total labor supply used in producing X, and
'kx 1ky is X's corresponding share of total capital. From the definitions
of a1, alys akXl and akY implied by (2.11) and (2.12) it is easy to show that:
dTkx
a =-Oa (w—r) + 0 a
(2.21) lx rx x rx x r
a =—9a (w-r)
ly .ryy
-. dTk
a =0a (w—r) -0a kxwxx wxxr
a =0a (w-r),
kywyy
where a and ay are the respective elasticities of substitution of capital for
labor in the two industries (e.g., a =k/(w-r)).Since Xix -Akx
=
(1-A1)
—
(lXky)
=
Aky
—
Alyt
subtracting the bottom equation in (2.20) from
the top equation gives:
(2.22)1x Xkx'f) =akxAkx
-a1A1
+ akyxky -—23—
Substituting equation (2.21) into (2.22) yields:
(A —A)(X-Y) =[(GA+DX )a +(0A+0A )c ](w-r) lx kx wx kx rx lx x wy ky ry ly y
(2.23)
dTkx —[0 A +0 A }ci wxkxrxlx x r
If X is more labor intensive than Y, k >kwhich implies A1 >Akx?and
increases 'in the wage-rental ratio are associated with increases in the ratio
of x to
The corresponding equation for change -in the relative demand for X
and Y is obtained by differentiating the ratio of the demand for X to the
demand for Y determined by (2.24):
(2.24) X -Y=
In(2.24) iisthe elasticity of the demand for X relative to the demand for Y
with respect to the relative price ratio. r is negative since both X and Y
are assumed to be normal goods.
Equations (2.19), (2.23), and (2.24) are three equations in the unknowns
X -Y,w-r, and P—P. The solution for w-r is given by:
(w—r)[(A—A )(0 -Ø )+ (9A+0A )u +(0A +0A )a ) lx kxwx wy wx kx rx lx x wy ky ry ly y
(2.25) dTkx =[(0A +0X )a -r?(X-A )O I wxkx rx lx x lx kx rx r
where the bracketed term on the right hand side of (2.25) multiplying (w-r)-24-
is positive since (Alx_Akx) and (0<-0,) have the same sign.3
In evaluating the incidence of the tax, we choose I, the level of total
nominal income, as the numeraire. With I fixed, we have from (2.16):
(2.26) dw•L +drK=-KdTx kx
The right hand side of (2.24) is the marginal tax revenue evaluated at Tkx =0.
The equation indicates that the burden of the tax equals the burden on labor,
dwL, plus the burden on capital, drK. This equation can be rewritten as:
0 K dT
2 xkx
(2.26') w +r=- — ____
k K
r
where 01 and 0k are labor's and capital's respective shares of total income.
Obviously, if w =0,the tax is fully born by labor, and vice-versa if r =0.
Substituting for w from (2.26') into (2.25) and expressing capital's
burden as a share of the total burden gives:
dr
dT 0 0A +0 A)cr -(A -X )0 kx 2 wxkx rx lx x lx kx rx
(2.27) K
=
0k
+
0 x kx
where D is the bracketed term on the left hand side of (2.25) multiplying
(w-r).
Consider, first, conditions under which the right hand side of (2.27) is
unity, i.e., capital bears the entire burden of the tax. A sufficient—25--
condition for this result is that both industries have the same elasticities
of substitution and the same initial factor proportions.In this case A1
Akx, and A, =Aky
(see note 1), and the bracketed term on the right hand side
of (2.27) equals XkX, implying that the right hand side of (2.27) equals 0k +
= 1.An alternative condition sufficient for capital to bear the entire
tax burden is that all three substitution elasticities, a>< ayi and i are
equal. In this case the bracketed term in (2.27) equals Akx•
If factor intensities are initially equal (implying Ai =Akx)and if
ax =0,capital's share of the tax burden equals its share of total income,
0k Intuitively, if =0capital and labor are used in fixed proportions in
X, and there is effectively only a single factor. The tax on capital in X,
which in this case is equivalent to simply taxing X, raises the relative price
of X leading to a reduction in its demand. To accomodate this reduced demand
the X industry releases both capital and labor to the V industry in the
proportion that these factors are used in producing X.If the V industry is
using these factors -in the same ratio, then it can expand production of V to
meet its increased demand with no change in factor proportions. Since ''Ts
capital labor ratio, k1 is unchanged, the ratio w/r upon which ky depends
(equation (2.13)) is unchanged. Hence, w and r both fall (relative to and
Py) by the same percentage. This same incidence outcomearises in the case
that capital and labor are perfect substitutes in producing V (civ =cx).From
industry V's perspective capital and labor are identical factors, and it will
use both factors only if their net costs are equal. This implies w =r,where
we measure capital in units such that one unit of capital is equivalent in
production to one unit of labor.—26-
Capital's share of the tax burden can also be less than its income share.
A necessary condition for this outcome is that the X industry be more labor
intensive than the V industry. Suppose, for example, a =0and Xix >Akx.
then the second term in (2.27) is negative indicating that capital's tax
burden share is less than In this case there is more labor relative to
capital released from X to V than industry V is initially using to produce.
To accomodate the initial relative excess supply of labor, the wage must fall
relative to the rental on capital. It is indeed possible that more than one
hundred percent of the burden of the tax on capital is shifted oto labor;
i.e., the righthand side of (2.27) can be negative, and capital can be made
absolutely better off by the capital income tax levied on industry X.
At the other extreme capital may bear more than 100 percent of the tax
burden; i.e., labor is made better off by the tax. Consider the outcome when
capital and labor are perfect substitutes in X.In this case x,andthe
demand for capital in X is perfectly elastic (see equation (2.7)). From
(2.27), when =cx,capital's share of the tax burden is +
whichexceeds 1.From the perspective of industry X, capital and labor are
identical factors, and the net costs to the industry of hiring labor and
capital must be equal (w =r+TkX);otherwise there would be an incentive to
substitute one factor for the other. Capital bears more than 100 percent of
the tax because, relative to the wage, the rental rate of capital declines in
both industries by the full amount of the tax.—27—
4. The Incidence of a Commodity Tax on Good X
Additional -insight into formula (2.27) can be obtained by considering
Mieskowski's (1967) observation that capital's share of the tax burden can be
divided -into output and substitution effects. Consider the term
e(A-A ) lx kx rx
AD
kx
which -isthesecond bracketed term in (2.27) multiplied by/AkxThis
expression is precisely capital's share of the burden of a tax on the
consumption of good x. To see this, note that in the case of a tax on good x,
the relative changes in producer prices and outputs are given by equations
(2.19) and (2.23), respectively, with a dTrx set to zero, and equation (2.24)
is modified to:
dT
(2.24') (x-y) ='xy
+
x
where is the per unit excise tax on good X.In addition, in (2.26) dTkx IS
set equal to zero. These revised versions of (2.19), (2.23), and (2.26), plus
(2.24') can be solved together to derive the formula given above for drK/dTX,
capital's share of the incidence of an excise tax on good X. Note that if
Alx =Xkxl
capital's and labor's shares of the tax burden are both zero; i.e.,
there is no change in the factor incomes received by capital and labor
measured at producer prices, although capitalist and workers bear the tax
burden as consumers. While income measured at procedure prices is the
numeraire and, therefore, doesn't change, real income of consumers falls—28-
because of the change in consumer prices. Consider the change in the cost
measured in units of good x of consuming the initial bundle, X0, V0. Let C
denote this cost, then:
T P
(2.28) C =(1+ -)X0 +
and
BC
(2.29) x Bi ITO
=
sinceP/P is unchanged by Twhenw -r=0(see equation (2.17) with dTkx =0).
Hence, measured at producer prices, the loss in real income to consumers from
a marginal increase in T equals the marginal tax revenue. Since capitalists
and workers are assumed here to have identical tastes, they bear the burden of
the tax in proportion to their share of total income.
Returning to equation (2.27), note that when =0,the second term in
(2.27) reduces to the output effect. This is what one would expect, since
when =0,a tax in industry X is effectively equivalent to an excise tax on
good X.If =0and =
Akx.capitalists and workers bear the tax through
a decline in their factor income rather than through an increase in the
consumer price level.
5.The Relationship of Welfare Changes to the Incidence
of a Sector-Specific Factor Tax
While the preceding analysis described changes in incomes of workers and
owners of capital arising from a sector-specific factor tax, a full analysis
of the associated welfare changes requires taking account of changes in the-29-
prices of the two commodit-ies, P> and Ps,. The assumption that workers and
capitalists have identical homothetic preferences implies that they both view
the price changes as equivalent to the same specific percentage change in
their incomes, which can be positive, negative, or zero depending on the
precise changes in prices. For example, the change in the welfare of workers
can be calculated from their indirect utility function, as:
w -
dVw— dwL
(2.30) =A wL[6P +6P +—]
dTkx xx yy
where w is the worker's marginal utility of income, arid (3and0arthe x y
respective (and identical for workers and capitalists) expenditure shares on X
and V. A similar expression involving the terms +8P ,reflectingprice
dK
changes, and —fl--, reflecting income changes, holds for capitalists.
K
Hence, the price related change in welfare 6 P +6p ,isthe same xx yy
fraction of income for both workers and capitalists, and the incidence terms,
dwL and drK, describe differential changes in the welfare of workers and
capitalists. Stated differently, workers and capitalists bear the tax both in
terms of possible changes in their incomes and, in their roles as consumers, in
terms of changes in consumer prices. However, the price changes are common to
both and have the same welfare impact as a 0>P + percentage change in
income, while the direct percentage changes in incomes due to changes in factor
payments can be quite different for the two groups.
In the special case that the direct percentage changes in incomes of
workers and capitalists are equal, one could describe the tax as simply-30-
"falling on consumers" through changes -in prices with no changes -in factor
incomes; i.e., since the model's numeraire can be freely choosen, we could
choose w or r as numeraire. In the case that both factors share the burden in
proportion to their incomes share, we have with the new numeraire convention
w =r=0.While nominal factor incomes remain constant, P> and, poss-ibly
rise and generate the same reduction in real factor incomes and welfare that
arises i-f I is choosen as the numeraire.
6.Extension to the Case of Differences in Preferences
Mieszkowski (1967) and Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) extend the analysis
of the incidence of sector-specific factor taxes to the case in which workers'
and capitalists' preferences differ. The results can be illustrated with the
following example. Let workers and the government consume only X, and let
capitalists consume only Y. Then the new demand equations are:
(2.14') P X =wE + T K x kxx
P V =rK,
y
and the change in relative demands associated with the tax is given by:
-.rKdTkx
(2.24') (X—Y) = ) + (w-r)+—
r
wL
Using (2.24') rather than (2.24), capital's share of the tax burden is:-31-
rK dr - x
K (0 A +0A )a -(A-A )(0 —
dTk 02wx x rx lx x lx kx
(2.27') —
K
=Ok+
0-(A-A ) x kx lx kx
Equation (2.27') is identical to (2.27) for r =1except for the additional term
(A1X—AkX)(rKX/WL) in the numerator and the term -(Alx-Akx) in the denominator.
When factor intensities are equal in X and Y we have the same result as
above that the incidence of the tax is independent of demand parameters. When
A,< demand elements enter, the demand structure (2.14') can either
reduce or increase the tax burden on capital. When the X industry is capital
intensive the fact that workers and the government spend all their expanded
income on X while capitalists adjust to their lower incomes simply ..y reduced
consumption of Y implies a smaller ultimate share of the tax burden falling on
capital. On the other hand, if X is labor intensive the smaller increase in
the incomes of workers relative to the A1 =A1
case feeds back to lower r by
more than would occur if demands were identical and homothetic.
C. Estimates of Tax Incidence in Static General Equilibrium Models
Tax incidence formulae, like that given in equation (2.25), are
appropriate only for small changes around an initial no tax equilibrium. To
examine the incidence of large tax changes as well as consider many more
sectors and types of consumers Shoven and Whalley (1972) constructed a
computable general equilibrium model. Their method of calculating an
equilibrium is based on Scarf's (1967,1973) algorithm and related techniques.4
The analysis of large perturbations of the equilibrium requires specifying
explicit functional forms for preferences and production technologies. The—32-
parameter of these functions are then selected such that initial equilibrium
values of the model are in rough accord with those actually observed in the
economy. This calibration of the model is not an econometric procedure,
although econometric findings, such as the estimated values of particular
elasticities of substitution, are often used as part of the calibration.
Table 1, which is based on Shoven's (1976) reported results, shows
calculations of corporate tax incidence for the United States for two sector
and twelve sector variants of the Shoven-Whalley model. The table reports the
share of the tax burden borne by capital for alternative elasticities of
substitution of the assumed CES production and demand functions.
For this particular experiment the two and twelve sector models yield
quite similar results. The incidence on capital is, however, very sensitive
to the assumed elasticities of substitution. A low relative demand
elasticity, a low elasticity of substitution in the non corporate sector, and
a high elasticity of substitution in the corporate sector imply reductions in
the net income of capital well in excess of 100 percent of the corporate tax
revenue. Alternatively, if capital and labor are both highly complementary in
producing the two goods = .25, =.25),capital's share. of the tax
burden is only a third.
While Shoven and halley's results on U.S. cor- -rate tax incidence, like
Harberger's (1962) original calculations based on equation (2.25), are
instructive for understanding tax incidence in static general equilibrium
models, their assumed values for corporate income tax rates are subject to
question. They estimate the effective marginal tax rate in different sectors
by calculating taxes collected as a fraction of reported profits. There are a-33-
number of problems with this procedure. Stiglitz (1973), for example, points
out that since interest is deductible from the corporate tax, the effective
marginal tax on debt financed corporate capital is zero. Other research
(e.g., Jorgenson (1963), Auerbach (1979a,1979c), King and Fullerton (1984),
Bradford (1981), Gordon (1985), Bulov and Summers (1984)), stresses the
importance of depreciation and other investment incentives, the tax treatment
of dividends and capital gains, and the risk sharing attributes of capital
income taxation as critical elements for determining effective marginal taxes
on capital income.
III. TAX INCIDENCE IN OPEN ECONOMIES
Our analysis has so far maintained the assumption of immobile factors.
This assumption is clearly inappropriate in considering taxes levied by a
single locality from or towards which capital and labor can migrate.
Increasingly, as capital becomes more mobile internationally, it is necessary
to recognize the effects of factor mobility in considering national tax
policies as well. In order to focus on the effects of factor mobility, we
return to the one good general equilibrium model of Section hA. We further
simplify it by assuming that the factor complementary to capital --here
labelled land --issupplied inelastically and is immobile.
A. A Simple Model of Factor Mobility
Analysis of tax incidence in a simple one good, two factor, two
country model provides important insights into the differences in incidence
results in open and closed economies. Following Bradford (1978), assume that-34-
the two factors of production are capital and land and that capital is
internationally mobile. In contrast to the analysis in section hA, of a
country-wide tax on capital in a closed economy, a tax on capital imposed by
one country on income earned by capital in that country is not fully borne by
the capital initially in the country imposing the tax. Since capital is
internationally mobile, reductions in capital rentals in one country imply
reductions in the other. Hence, the incidence of the tax borne by capital -is
spread evenly across all capital, regardless of the country in which -it is
ultimately used. In contrast to capital owners, landowners in the two
countries are differentially affected by the tax; there is a loss in rental
income to landowners in the country imposing the tax on capital and a gain to
landlords in the country with no tax on capital.
To see this let F(K) and G(K) be the respective production functions
in countries A and B. KA is the capital in country A, and K -
KA
=
KBis the
capital in country B, where 1< is total world-wide capital. If r is the rental
on capital, and Tisthe tax on capital in country A, we have:
(3.1) r +T = F'(KA)
r =G'(K8)
From these equations and the constraint KA +
KB
=Kit is easy to show that
the ratio of the change in worldwide capital income, K,to the change
in tax revenue, -rKAI calculated at the no tax equilibrium, is given by:
___ AK
(3.2)
KA
=-
(nBKB
+
TIAKA)
O—35-
where r and iB are the (nonnegative) respective demands for capital in
countriesA and B. Note that we are implicitly assuming that all tax revenue
is used to purchase the one good in the model. Suppose the functions F( )and
G( )areidentical, then A =B'and =
KBinitially. In this case the
right hand side of (3.2) equals -1, and world—wide capital bears the full
marginal burden of the tax. In the case that the demand for capital in B is
perfectly inelastic, B =0,or is perfectly elastic in A, =, world-wide
capital bears more than 100 percent of the tax.If, at the opposite extreme,
capital is in perfectly elastic demand in country B or in perfectly inelastic
demand in A, world-wide capital bears none of the burden of the tax.
Land rents in A, RA, and B, RB, are expressed in (3.3):
(3.3) RA =F(KA)
—
(r+T)KA
RB =G(K6)
-
rKB,
and these expressions imply:
dRA
(3.4) d-r - <0
KA flBKB +AKA
dRB
_____ AKB =
KA BKB +T1AKA
Note that the three tax burden expressions in (3.2) and (3.4) sum to -1. In
the case of identical production functions, while world-wide capital bears the
full burden of the tax, landowners in country A lose rents equal to half of-36-
marginal tax revenues, while landlords in B gain rents equal to half of
marginal tax revenues. In the extreme cases that eitherB =0or =
landownersin country A suffer no loss in rents, while landowners in B enjoy
marginal increases in rents equal to KB.If B =(xJ, or11A =0,landlords in A
bear the full marginal burden of the tax with no change in the rents of
capitalists or landowners in B.
The lesson of this model is that a country in an open worldeconomy or a
state or locality within a country is likely to bear a significant fraction of
the burden of a tax it levies on an internationally or domestically mobile
factor. From (3.4) it is easy to see that the smaller is the country, state,
or locality imposing the tax relative to the world or domestic economy (the
smaller is the ratio of KA to KB), the larger is the burden on immobile
factors, in this case land, in the taxing jurisdiction. In the limit as
KB/KA approaches infinity the marginal loss -in land rents in country A equals
the amount of marginal taxes raised (equation (3.2)). While one couldsay in
this case that land in country A bears the full burden of the tax, it is also
the case that world-wide capital income -is reduced by rA/7B times the marginal
tax revenue, and land rents in country B rise by r?A/rB times the marginal tax
revenue. In the symmetric case where the home and foreign countries have the
same production function a tax on domestic capital is borne completely by
capital on a worldwide basis. At the other extreme when the taxing
jurisdiction is very large relative to the rest of the world—wide or
country—wide economy (KB/KA0), capital bears the full burden of the tax,
and there are no marginal changes in land rents in either A or B.-37—
B. Further Implications of the Simple Open Economy Model
This simple open economy model has several further implications for the
analysis of taxes -in open economies. It suggests a sharp distinction between
taxes on savings and investment. The former are based on capital -income
earned by domestic residents regardless of the location of their capital while
the latter involve the taxation of income from capital that is located in the
home country. First, in this static model, a tax levied by country A at the
personal level on the capital income received by its residents regardless of
where that capital is invested is equivalent to a lump sum wealth tax and will
be fully borne by domestic capital owners. In contrast, as just described, if
country A taxes, at the business level, capital income earned on domestic
capital (regardless of ownership) the tax will fall on foreign as well as
domestic capital owners and can also lower the income of domestic factors such
as labor and land. Hence, from the perspective of the taxing country a tax on
investment income at the business level is, at least in part and possibly in
full, effectively a tax on wages and land rents, while a tax on capital income
at the personal level has little or no affect on wages or land rents.
Second, consider a tax on capital income at the business level that
distinguishes domestically owned from foreign owned capital. An example
would be a tax on the repatriation of foreign capital income.If this tax is
sufficiently high it may pay foreigners to stop investing in the home country,
and the resulting equilibrium -in this case would be one of autarky in which
domestic residents only invest at home and foreigners only invest in their own
countries. If T is the domestic tax on foreign capital income earned domesti-
cally, rd is the domestic pre-tax rate of return, andr is the return to—38—
foreign capital invested in the foreign country, the condition for autarky is
that r >rd_T, andrd >r.In this case both domestic residents and
foreigners earn a higher return at the margin by investing in their own
countries. While this tax would collect no revenue, by driving out foreign
domestic investment it raises the return to domestic capital and lowers the
return to fixed domestic factors of production. Note that the incidence of a
law prohibiting foreign investment would be identical to that of a tax that
drives out such investment.
C. Incidence of the Property Tax
The simple open economy model is also useful for thinking about the
controversial issue of the incidence of local property taxes. Since property
taxes are typically levied on both land and capital, one might decompose the
incidence of the tax into that arising from taxing land and that from taxing
capital. In the simple static open economy model discussed at the beginning
of this section, a tax on land rents is fully borne by land owners. However,
as described above the tax on capital may be shifted. The extent of shifting
will depend not on the size of the local property tax per Se, but on its size
relative to that in other communities. To see this, consider the two city
(country) model in which TA is the property tax in city A and TB the tax in
city B. The conditions corresponding to (3.1) are:
F'(KA) =r+
TA
(3.1')
F'(K_KA) =r+
TB
Clearlyif TA =TB = T, rfalls by the full amount of the tax and capital
bears the full burden of property taxes levied on capital. If TA exceeds-39-
TB the differential tax, TA -TB,will lower land rents -in A and -increase
rents in B. Capital will bear the differential tax in part, in full, or more
than in full depending on differences in capital demand elasticities and,
given such differences, in the relative size of the two cities. To see this,
one need only replace T by TA -TBand r by r +T8in equations (3.1) and
(3.3).
This "new view" of the incidence of the property tax associated with
Mieszkowsk-i (1972,1984), Mieszkowski and Zodrow (1984), and Zodrow and
Mieszkowski (1983,1984) contrasts sharply with the "benefit tax" argument of
Tiebout (1956) which is extensively examined by Daniel Rubinfeld in Chapter
11. In Tiebout's model individuals can costlessly establish new communities
providing the level of local public goods they most desire. As formally
modeled by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980), in setting up new communities the
Tiebout result holds if one assumes that founders of communities take as given
the utility levels of individuals they hope to attract. Hence, they must
offer competitive utility levels to potential residents. The model also
assumes perfect mobility of all productive factors. The tax used to finance
local public goods makes no difference in the Tiebout local public goods
equilibrium, because it is fully internalized by individuals living in their
communities; any individual in the Tiebout model is free to establish a new
community identical to his existing community. The individual might, for
example, live in a community where taxes are levied on land rents; but he can
costlessly set up a new community that provides the same local public goods
and attracts the same residents, but that exempts the individual from paying
taxes on land rents, and instead, taxes the individual on his wages, or in the-40-
value of his car, or his consumption of food, etc. Provided the same amount
of taxes are paid by the individual, there will be no real difference between
the new and the old community.
The fact that the individual is free at the margin to establish a new
community and pay for local public goods in any way he prefers means that the
individual internalizes the tax; i.e., the individual views the tax as
equivalent to a payment to purchase the type of community he most prefers
given the level of utility that must be provided to attract residents to the
community. Since the equilibrium is the same whether the local tax is
labelled a wage, property, income, sales, or other tax, the incidence is
unaffected by the tax base chosen. Hence, in the Tiebout model, the incidence
of local taxes does not fall on particular factors of production, but is fully
borne by individual residents. We can say that each resident bears the burden
of the taxes paid, just as one can say that an individual buying a private
goods bears the burden of paying for that good.
Atkinson and Stiglitz's (1980) derivation of the Tiebout result assumes
that each resident employs his productive factors in his own community. But
one can modify this assumption and may still end up with the same real
equilibrium. Consider, for example, a Tiebout equilibrium in which
individuals own capital and initially employ that capital in their own
community. Also assume that the production function depends on land and
capital. Suppose the local tax is nominally assessed on local property
including all capital and land in the community. In such a setting owners of
capital would not be indifferent to employing their capital locally or
employing it in another community. When employed locally, the taxes paid on—41-
capital are simply viewed as part of the payment for local public goods.
However, if the capital were employed in another community and earned the same
pretax return, the taxes paid on capital to the other community would not be
viewed as effectively purchasing local public goods at the margin, since the
owner of the capital invested in someone else's community derives no utility
from the local public goods provided by any but his own community.
One assumption, suggested by Hamilton (1975,1976,1983), Fischel (1975),
and White (1975) that might permit the Tiebout result to go through in this
setting is that each community zones a section of land for productive
enterprises. Suppose that firms have identical production functions and use
capital and labor in fixed proportions. Suppose, further, that the property
tax rate in the industrial zone is the same as that in the rest of the
community, that community members are homogeneous, and own equal shares of the
land in the industrial zone. Also assume that firms require no local public
goods to operate; i.e., they have no demand for local public goods. Now if
land rents in each zoned area fall by the amount of property taxes levied on
land and capital in the industrial zones, owners of capital will receives the
same net return if they invest in their own community or some other community,
since what they pay in property taxes they save in reduced land rents. In
this model the industrial zones are identical to communities that do not
provide local public goods and have no property taxes. Consider now the lower
land rents received by local residents owning land in the industrial zones.
This lower land rent is effectively part of the price they pay for their local
public goods; i.e., while firms in the industrial zones send in the property
tax check to the local government, the local residents effectively pay this-42-
tax in the form of receiving reduced land rents. In this model, taxes on
capital, whether or not they are identical across communities, are fully
shifted from owners of capital onto local community residents.
As Rubinfeld points out in Chapter 11, the assumptions required for the
"benefit tax" view to hold precisely appear far from being satisfied in actual
settings. While the "new view" of the property tax appears to be correct, at
least in the short run for additional increases in property tax rates,many of
the forces leading to the "benefit tax" result appear to be at play, albeit
slowly; hence, it may be incorrect to view the local property tax simply
according to the "new view," since a large fraction of the distortions from
this tax may have been offset over time by benefit tax forces, such as changes
-in zoning and migration across localities and states.
IV. DYNAMIC MODELS OF TAX INCIDENCE
The analysis of tax incidence presented in the preceding section was
entirely static. This made it impossible to study two important dimensions of
tax incidence. First, taxes will, in general, affect savings and investment
decisions, leading to effects on capital accumulation which, in turn, will
alter the marginal productivities of both capital and labor and, thus, factor
returns. Second, when taxes are altered, the prices of taxed and possibly
non-taxed assets are likely to change, thus capitalizing the effects of the
tax change. The windfall capital gains and losses associated with tax reforms
are an important aspect of their incidence. A closely related issue is
intergenerational incidence. Tax policies may burden members of different-43-
generations differently. Where capitalization effects are important, the
owners of taxed assets at the time the tax is imposed may bear up to the
entire future burden of the tax.
In this section, we develop a sequence of models illustrating
intertemporal aspects of tax incidence. We begin by considering tax incidence
in the context of the life cycle, overlapping generations model of Diamond
(1965, 1970). The overlapping generations model distinguishes members of
d-ifferent generations explicitly and so is ideal for studying
intergenerational incidence. For reasons of analytical convenience, we follow
Diamond in working with a model in which only two generations are alive at any
point in time.
In the discussion we distinguish between fiscal policies that directly
redistribute across generations without having direct effects on relative
prices and policies that directly affect relative prices, but only indirectly
alter the intergenerational redistribution of resources. Actual fiscal
policies generally combine these two effects, but considering each separately
enhances one's intuition about dynamic fiscal policy. In addition, much of
the concern with deficit and related policies that redistribute across
generations is with their income effects; hence, it is useful to clarify
precisely how the income effects from intergenerational redistribution can
alter savings.
The two period model may be misleading in its portrayal of the behavior
of actual economies, and multiperiod models may yield rather different
behavior in some circumstances. An illustrative simulation of switching tax
regimes is presented based on the Auerbach-Kotlikoff (1986) 55 period life-44-
cycle simulation model. We also show in this section how introducing bequest
motives can alter the intergenerational incidence of certain tax policies that
arises in the life cycle model without bequest motives. These models
presented in the first part of this section assume a single good that can
either be consumed or used as capital. In addition, there are zero costs of
transforming a unit of capital into a unit of consumption, and visa versa.
Introducing such adjustment costs or adding additional assets, such as land,
to the model, permits the possibility of asset evaluation associated with the
changes. Asset revaluation is examined first within the partial equilibrium
model of Summers (1981) in which changes in corporate policy alter the stock
value of firms. Next, Feldstein's (1979) two period model of land rent
taxation is presented to illustrate asset revaluation in a general equilibrium
context.
The general message of this section is that tax policies can have
important effects on the time path of capital formation, the evolution of
factor prices and asset values, arid the intergenerational distribution of
welfare. The models and examples of policy presented in this section indicate
the range of incidence effects arising from dynamic tax policy; but these
models and examples only illustrate potential intertemporal tax incidence
effects; they certainly do not represent an exhaustive characterization of the
government's intertemporal fiscal policies, nor do they illustrate all
possible time paths of dynamic tax incidence.—45—
A.Tax Incidence in a Life Cycle, Overlapping Generations Model
We begin by considering the simplest overlapping generations model in
which individuals live for two periods, working only in the first period.
Capital does not depreciate in this model, and there is no technical progress.
We assume that the population and labor force grows exogenously at rate n.
Individuals who are young at time t maximize a utility function
Ut =(Cii,C2+1) subject to the budget constraint:
(4.1) c2.1 =(w_c1)(1+r+1)
where r+1 is the interest rate at t+1, and V4 is the wage at time t.If the
government has no assets the total capital stock in period t+1 simply
corresponds to the assets of the private sector at t+1. But since young
workers initially have no wealth, private assets at time t+1 equal the wealth
of the old at t÷1 generation. The wealth of the elderly at t+1, in turn,
equals the saving they did when young. Capital per worker can thus be
expressed as:
wc1 (w ,r1)
(4.2) k+1(w,r+1) 1+n
where kt+i(w, r+1) represents the capital labor ratio at time t4-1, and c1(
represents the first period consumption function. We assume a standard
concave production function f(k), with f'(k) > 0 and f"(k) < 0, and that
factors are compensated competitively. In steady state the condition:
k -w(k)-c[w(k),r(k)]
1+n
must be satisfied. Diamond (1970) points out that the steady state will be
stable as long as:—46-
ac
1 aw 1
(4.4) (j-)[ ——] <1
1. Price Effects
a. The Incidence of a Capital Income Tax
As stressed above, the incidence of a tax depends critically on
government's use of its tax revenue. To highlight price effects, we examine
the case of a capital income tax, assuming that the tax revenue is fully
rebated in a lump sum transfer to individuals in their second period of life.
The steady state condition then becomes:
w(k) —
(4.5) k =
1+n
Note that when the tax revenue, I = Tr(w-C1)is compensated in period 2, the
budget constraint in the presence of taxation:
(4.6) C1 + 1+r(1-T) =W+
1+r(1-i)
reduces to (4.1). While the compensated tax leaves the consumer's budget
constraint unchanged, it alters the consumer's perceived after tax price of
C2;
hence, in (4.5) C1 is written as a function of the after tax interest rate as
well as the wage. If the utility function is concave, it is easy to verify
that the derivative of C1 with respect to the compensated interest income tax
rate T is positive, i.e.,
ac
(4.7) .J>—47-
Hence, from (4.4), (4.5), and (4.7), we have:
BC
Bk
-
(4.8)—= <0 BC
3w 1 1-( -
Thusan interest income tax compensated -in the second period unambiguously
reduces capital intensity. This means that the pre-tax return to capital
rises and the wage falls. The tax is thus at least partially shifted to
labor. Indeed, as Diamond (1970) shows, it is possible that capital intensity
will decline so much that the post-tax return to capital actually rises.
Under the assumption of a linear homogeneous production function, and
expressing output per worker as f, equation (4.9) indicates how r(1-T) changes
with T.5
(4.9)
Br(1-T)=rk(1+n)[
-
BC
([i/f" +(k- +
Since =-f"kthe denominator in (4.9) is negative assuming (4.4). Hence,
the long run after tax return to capital rises, provided:
4 10 (1+n)f< 1 — rw 1+r 3w
where a =-(rw/fkf")is the elasticity of substitution. Hence, the smaller
the elasticity of substitution, the larger will be the net of tax return to
capital.-48-
b. The Incidence of Labor Income Tax
Consider next the question of the incidence of a labor income tax in a
growing economy. This question was first examined by Feldstein (1974c) who
stressed that in the long run this may depend only on its effect on capital
intensity. He noted that reductions in labor supply that are not associated
with changes in the long run saving rate will have no effect on long run
capital intensity, and concluded that the elasticity of labor supply
potentially has no effect on the long run incidence of a labor income tax.
Feldstein's point can be illustrated in the two period model by assuming that
first period labor supply per worker, L, is variable, while second period
labor supply is zero. In this case the steady state formula for the capital
stock in the presence of labor income tax, that is compensated in the first
period is:
(4 11) k —T+ w(k)(1—T)L[w(k)(1—i-) + T, r(k)] -C[w(k)(1—T)+T, r(k)]
(1+n)Lw(k)(1—T)4 T, r(k)]
where T =TWL.
Assuming that utility is homothetic in C1 and C2, and separable from 1,
C1 is proportional to w(1—T)L + T.In this case it is immediate from (4.11)
that steady state k is unaffected by responses in L to changes in T since both
the numerator and denominator of (4.11) rise or fall by the same percentage.
Kotlikoff and Summers (1979) make the point that the effects of a labor
income tax on the timing of labor supply over the life cycle will affect its
long run incidence. This is because changes in the time stream of labor income
over individuals' lifetimes will, in general, affect the national savings rate.—49-
Such effects may be important if, for example, taxes affect retirement ages, or
the elasticity of labor supply differs at different ages. To see this, assume
that labor supply in the second period as well as the first period is variable.
Denote by L1 and L2 first and second period labor supply, respectively, by
T first period consumption of the first period tax, and by T2 second period
compensation of the second period tax. The formula for the steady state
capital stock is floW:
(4.12) k =
(1+n)L1+L2
Assuming that utility is homothetic -in
C1and C2 and separable from both
L1 and L2, C1 will be proportional to w(1—T)[L1 +(L2/14-r)]
+
T1
+T2/1-fr,
which equals simply w(L1 +L2/1+r).Hence, -if L1 and L2 change by the same
proportion in response to the compensated wage tax, the effect on long run k
of the labor supply response is zero. HoWever, L1 and L2 will not, -in
general, change in the same proportion. If, for example, L2 falls by a
greater percentage than L1 in response to the compensated wage tax, this labor
supply response will lead to a larger steady state value of k than would
otherwise be the case.
2. Income Effects
a. Explicit Intergenerational Redistribution
Turning to direct intergenerational income effects from tax policy,
consider for the case of a compensated capital income tax how switching the
compensation from a payment to the elderly to a payment to young workers—50-
affects the results. In this case the steady state budget constraint (4.6) is
given by:
C
(4.6')C + 2=w+T
1 1 +r(1—T)
and (4.5) becomes:
w(k) +T—C[w(k) +T,r(k)(1-T)] (45') k= 1
1+n
Comparing(4.6')with (4.6), it is clear that prov-id-ing the compensation
the first rather than the second generation raises lifetime income by
[Tr(1—T)]/[1+r(1T)] and produces an income effect which raises C1 beyond what
occurs with second period compensation, assuming C1 is a normal good. But f
C2 is also normal, then some part of the extra present value of resources
associatedwith first period compensat-iori, T1, will be saved for second period
consumption. Hence, relative to the case of second period compensation, first
period compensation leads to more steady state savings. In the case of first
period compensation the change in the steady state capital stock associated
with an increase in the capital income tax rate is:
rk
2(1 aw
— +
1 2 ,aw1 1 1
— —
ak
/14-n
where[ak/aT]2 denotes the expression in (4.8) for a second period compensated
tax, and [ak/aT]1 denotes the derivative of k with respect to a tax oncapital
incomethat is compensated in the first period.—51-
This analysis of switching compensation from the second to the first
period illustrates a general proposition of life cycle models, namely that
redistribution from older to younger generations raises savings. While the
equations presented above do not describe the economy's transition path to the
new steady state, it is easy to see that switching from second to first period
compensation reduces the resources of the initial generation of elderly and,
correspondingly, raises the lifetime resources o-Fsuccessivegenerations.
Since in the life cycle model older generations have larger marginal
propensities to consume than younger generations, intergenerational
redistribution towards younger generations lowers total private consumption
and raises national saving. The associated increase in capital formation, in
the case of a closed economy, leads to increases in pre-tax wages and declines
in pre-tax returns to capital.
b. Implicit Intergenerational Redistribution
A variety of government fiscal policies redistribute resources across
generations, thus potentially altering the time path of pre-and post tax
factor returns and altering the intergenerational distribution of welfare.
Government deficit policy associated with temporary reductions in tax rates
and subsequent increases in tax rates in excess of their initial values is a
prime example of intergenerational redistribution. In this case initial
generation gain at the expense of future generations because initial
generations enjoy the benefits of the tax cut, but escape through death or
retirement the subsequent tax rate increase.
While explicit deficit policy is a clear mechanism of intergenerational—52—
redistribution, there are a variety of other', quite subtle intergenerational
redistribution mechanisms at the government's disposal. Summers (1981) shows
that balanced budget changes in the tax structure can significantly alter the
level of long run savings because of its attendant intergenerational income
effects. Take, as an example, the case of a balance budget switch from a
consumption to a wage tax in our simple two period life cycle model in which
labor is supplied only in the first period and workers work full time
independent of the wage. The steady state budget constraint in the case of a
consumption tax is:
(l+T)
(4.13) Ci(1+T) +C21+(k)
=
W(kc)
and the formula for steady state capital per worker, k, 'iS:
w(k)C [w(k)/(1+T),r(kfl
(4.14)k =c1
C 1+n
In the case of a wage tax the budget constraint is:
(4.15) C1 +1+rk)
=w(k)(1-T)
and steady state capital per worker, k, is:
k -w(kw)(l_Tw)
-C1[w(k)(l-T),r(k)]
(4.16) w
—
1+n
Now if (1+Tc)' = 1- andkw =k,the two budget constraints are
identical; however, comparing (4.14) and (4.16), it is clear that steady state—53-
capital under a consumption tax, k, exceeds steady state capital under a wage
tax,k. The intuitive explanation for this is that even assuming
(1+Tc)1 =1-
Twswitching from a consumption to a wage tax relieves the tax
burden on the first generation of elderly at the time of the tax switch.
Consequently, their consumption rises relative to what occurs under a
consumption tax. While the consumption of the initial generation of young
workers does not change (assuming (1-fTc)' =1-Tand noting that the
initial period wage is that of the consumption tax steady state), initial
period total private consumption rises and national saving falls. The induced
initial decline in the capital stock lowers subsequent first period saving of
young workers because of the associated change infactorprices.
The assumption that (1fTc)' =1-isnot, however, necessarily valid
either in the initial or subsequent periods. If G is the assumed constant
level of government consumption per worker, the steady state balance budget
equation for Tc is:
(4.17) Tc{Ci[w(kc)/(1+Tc)ir(kc)] + C2{w(kc)/(1+Tc),r(kc)]()} =6
The corresponding equation in the balanced budget wage tax steady state is:
(4.18) Tw(k) =6
In actual simulations of multiperiod models, Summers (1981) and Auerbach and
Kotlikoff (1983a), find (1+T)' < 1 —T;i.e., on a wage tax equivalent
basis the steady state consumption tax is less than the steady state wage
tax.-54-
Other Fiscal policies that redistribute towards early generations and
away from future generations are unfunded "pay as you go" Social Security and
policies involving reductions in investment incentives (Auerbach and
Kotlikoff, 1983b).
B.Income Effects with Intergenerational Altruism and the
Possible Neutrality of Intergeneration Transfers
As just described, in life cycle models in which each generation cares
only about its own consumption, intergenerational redistribution can alter the
course of capital formation and the factor returns received by different
generations. In contrast, in Barro's (1974) model of intergenerational
altruism, nondistortionary redistribution across generations has no impact on
any real variable, including capital formation and factor returns. Since
government deficit policy constitutes one of many mechanisms by which the
government transfers resources across generations, Barro's model implies that
non—distortionary deficit policies would neither reduce capital formation nor
affect any other real variables.
Barro's proposition can be clarified by considering the intergeneration-
ally altruistic utility function given in (4.19):
Ut =u{ct2t,ut 1,2ti,u2(ct2,1t2, .
(4.19)
=V(Ct,2t,Ct+1,2+1i.
.
In(4.19) the utility of generation t depends on the consumption and leisure
enjoyed by generation t, C. and as well as the utility of children,
generation t+1. But since the utility of children, generation t+1, is a-55-
function of C,1, and their children's utility, Ut isafunction
of C, C÷1, andU.2. Recursive substitution of the arguments of
etc., implies that U. can be written as a function V( )ofall
levels of consumption and leisure of current and future family members. Thus
continuous altruistic intergenerational linkages effectively imply that
generation t cares about the consumption and leisure of all future
descendants.
In choosing its time path of consumption and leisure, Barro's altruistic
infinite horizon family maximizes (4.19) subject to the infinite horizon
budget constraint give y:
C +E t+s t-I-s
(4.20) 1+R =Ht+At_Tt
t 1-s
In (4.20) 1/1-4-Rt+5 is the price at time t of a dollar received at t+s,
Ht is the present value of the infinite horizon family's full time endowment
of human capital, At is the family's net worth at time t, and Tt is the
present value of the family's taxes less transfers. Consider now
nondistortionary redistribution between family members of different
generations that leaves unchanged the present value of the family's net tax
payments. Such redistribution leaves Tt and, therefore, the budget constraint
(4.20) unchanged. Since (4.9) is maximized subject to (4.20), this policy has
no impact on the Barro family's time path of consumption and leisure and,
therefore, no impact on saving, investment, or labor supply.
C.Transition Effects
A crucial question in assessing analyses of steady state tax incidence is—56-
the length of time -ittakesthe economy to converge to a new steady state
following tax reforms. This issue is taken up by Bernheim (1981), Auerbach
and Kotlikoff (1983a), and Chamley (1982). Not surprisingly, their results
indicate that the rate of transit between steady states depends on all the
parameters of the model being considered. Bernheim's results suggest
convergence to new steady state at an exponential rate of between 5 and 20
percent per year following a tax reform. This implies that the half life of
the adjustment process is likely to exceed 15 years in many cases. The
explicit life cycle model of Auerbach and Kotl-ikoff implies a somewhat greater
speed of adjustment, as does Chamley's (1981) infinite horizon model. Chamley
(1981) makes the point that the process of adjustment is faster with myopic
than with rational expectations.
As an illustration of these transition effects, consider Auerbach and
Kotlikoff's simulation results (see Kotlikoff, 1984) describing the transition
paths from balanced budget structural tax changes. In the Auerbach-Kotlikoff
life cycle model, agents live for 55 periods, corresponding to adult ages
of 21 to 75, and are concerned only with their own welfare, i.e., they have no
bequest motive. The model incorporates variable labor supply, including
endogenous retirement, with preferences over current and future values of
consumption and leisure described by a CES utility function. The production
sector is characterized by a CES production function. An important
contribution of the model is that it solves the economy's perfect foresight
equ-ilibr-ium transition path from an initial to a final steady state equation.
During this transition there is market clearing for all goods, factors, and
assets.-57-
Equation (4.20) presents the CES utility function of consumption, C, and
leisure, 2,underlyingthe life cycle policy simulations described below.
55 1)'
(4.20) U =
a1
(1)al [iC1' +(1-2(1l/111/P
In (12) 6 in the time preference rate, p is the "static" elasticity of
substitution between consumption and leisure at each age a, giisa consumption
share parameter, and 'y is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution between
consumption and leisure at different ages. The reciprocal of y equals the
coefficient of relative risk aversion.
Baseline parameter values for 6, j,y,p and a, the elasticity of
substitution of capital for labor in the production function, are .015, 1.5,
.25, .8 and 1, respectively. These figures are mid-range estimates based on a
variety of empirical studies many of which are cited in Auerbach, Kotlikoff
and Skinner (1983).
Table 2 contains the simulation results for changes in the tax base from
proportional income taxation to either proportional consumption, wage, or
capital income taxation with each designed to yield equal revenues. The
simulated economy has an initial steady state capital—output ratio of 3.7, a
capital-labor ratio of 5, a pre-tax wage normalized to 1, a 6.7 percent
pre-tax real interest rate, a 3.7 percent net national saving rate, and a 15
percent proportional tax on all income. Since there are no transfer programs,
receipts from the 15 percent income tax are solely used to finance government
consumption. In each of Table 2's simulations government consumption per—58-
capita is held fixed, and the tax rate of the specified tax base is adjusted
to produce revenues equal, on an annual basis, to the exogenous path of
government consumption.
Table 2 displays the large impact structural tax policies can have on an
economy's saving rate and related variables. Relative to the initial income
tax regime, long run saving rates are 19 percent larger under a consumption
tax, 8 percent larger under a wage tax, and 32 percent smaller under a capital
income tax. Changes in the economy's saving rate during the transition period
are even more dramatic; in the first year after the switch to consumption
taxation, the saving rate rises to 93 percent from an initial value of 3.7.
In the case of the capital income tax, there is a negative 2.9 percent saving
rate in the first year of the transition, and saving rates remain negative for
over a decade.6 The figures in Table 2 would, of course, all be magnified in
absolute value if one started with a larger initial steady state income tax.
For example, a structural shift to consumption taxation starting from a 30
percent income tax ultimately increases the capital-labor ratio by 63 percent,
rather than the 24 percent increase of Table 3.
These changes in after tax prices of factors and goods obviously alter
the utility levels of each cohort alive at the time of the tax change or born
thereafter. One measure of these utility differences is the equivalent
percentage increase in full lifetime resources needed in the original income
tax regime to produce each cohort's realized level of utility under the
specified alternative tax regimes. For cohorts living in the new long run
equilibrium under consumption, wage, and capital income tax regimes the
equivalent variations are 2.32 percent, -.89 percent, and -1.14percent.7—59-
These f-gures are smaller than the long run changes -in wage rates indicated -in
Table 3, because they encompass the additional amount of both lifetime leisure
and consumption that could hypothetically be afforded in the old steady state.
Stated differently since 65 percent of lifetime resources are spent on leisure
in the initial steady state, a 2.32 percent increase in full time resources
would permit a 6.63 (2.32/.35) percent increase in lifetime consumption,
holding leisure constant.
0.Asset Prices and Tax Incidence
In both the static and dynamic models we have considered so far, there
are no costs of adjustment impeding the accumulation or reallocation of
capital. In addition there has been no distinctions made concerning the tax
treatment of different assets. As a consequence, there was no scope in these
models for variation in the prices of capital goods and other assets. Studies
of tax incidence within this framework focus on the effects of tax changes on
the wage and after tax rate of return, because the constancy of the relative
price of assets precludes any wealth effects.
The implausibility of these assumptions may be seen by noting their
implication that corporate shareowners would not lose relative to homeowners
from increases in the tax burdens on corporate capital. More generally,
standard general equilibrium models have the counterfactual implication that
all owners of capital should have the same preferences about tax policy, since
all capital will be equally affected. Capitalists would have no reason
particularily to oppose taxes on their industry. This is because the standard
approach to tax incidence ignores an -important aspect of the actual economy's-60-
response to such a tax change, namely, that adjustment intherelative stocks
of capital goods is neither instantanous or costless. Hence, the short run
supplies of capital goods can be quite elastic, implying upward sloping short
run supply curves of firms as well as short run rents that are capitalized in
asset markets.
Take the example of a reduction in corporate taxes. In the short run,
the price of existing corporate capital would rise, and of existing homes
would fall, as investors reallocated their portfolios. The price changes
would capitalize the expected present value of the effects of the tax reform
on future returns, conferring windfall gains on the owners of corporate
capital, and losses on homeowners. These price changes would act as signals
to the suppliers of new capital, calling forth more plant and equipment and
fewer homes, until their relative prices were again equated to their relative
long run marginal costs of production.
The extreme volatility of asset prices in the American economy suggests
that these "capitalization" effects are of substantial importance. The ratio
ofthe market value of corporate capital to its replacement cost has varied by
a factor of more than two over the last 15 years. The relative price of the
stock of owner occupied housing has increased very substantially. Bulow and
Summers (1984) point to evidence of substantial volatility in the prices of
specific used capital goods. Even more extreme volatility has been observed
in the relative price of non-reproducible assets such as land, gold, and
Rembrandts. Such relative price changes represent important transfers of
wealth, and must be considered if the incidence of tax changes is to be
accurately assessed.—61-
A second type of example suggests the importance of focusing on asset
prices in examining tax incidence. Investment can be stimulated by reducing
the corporate tax rate or by the use of incentives for new investment such as
the investment tax credit or accelerated depreciation. In the long run, these
two types may be designed to have very similar effects. But their incidence
will differ dramatically. Because the former policy benefits old as well as
new capital, it will confer a windfall gain on the owners of capital at the
time that reform is announced. On the other hand, investment incentives may
actually confer a windfall loss on the holders of existing capital (Summers
(1981), Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1983b), Auerbach and Hines, (1986)). This
distinction cannot be captured within the standard general equilibrium model,
but requires a framework in which the distinction between new and old capital
is a meaningful one.
1. Asset Prices and Investment:
An Illustrative Partial Equilibrium Model
The following partial equilibrium model of valuation of a firn's capital
is a simplified version of the framework used in Summers' (1981b). Assume
that there -is one type of nondepreciable capital that is supplied elastically
because of either internal or external adjustment costs. That is:
(4.21) K =I(PK(l+s))I' >0,1(1) =0
where K is the firm's capital stock, K is the price its capital goods relative
to consumption goods, s is the subsidy paid to the purchase of new investment
goods, and I () isthe firm's net rate of investment function. Note that K
can be negative. Assume further that the capital good K is used in a
production process where it earns a total return F'(K)K and that F"(K) is—62-
negative. Finally assume that all returns are paid out and that investors
require some fixed rate of return p. to induce them to hold the capital assets.
The returns to holding a unit of capital come in the form of rents FT(K) arid
capital gains so that:
(4.22) pF'(K)(l-T)+
Equations (4.21) and (4.22) describe the dynamics of the adjustment of
the quantity and price of capital for T =s=0.The phase diagram is
depicted in Figure 2. Equilibrium occurs at the intersection of the two
schedules at the point where F'(K) =p.Note that the system displays saddle
point stability. Except along a unique path marked by the dark arrows, the
system will not converge. Only along this path does the supply of investment
exactly validate the future returns capitalized into the market price of
capital goods. Such saddle point stability is characteristic of asset price
models. It implies that at any point in time, the stock of capital and
assumption of saddle point stability uniquely determine the asset price of
capital.
The phase diagram in Figure 2 can be used to examine the effects of
various types of tax changes. In Figure 3 the effect of a tax on the asset's
marginal product is considered. Such a tax does not affect its supply curve
so that the K =0locus does not shift. The reduction in after tax returns
due to the increase in T leads to a leftward shift in the =0locus. Such
an increase in the tax rate has no immediate effect on the capital stock, but
the market price of capital drops from E1 to B. As capital is decumulated,Figure 2. The Dynamics of Capital Accumulation
The Effects of an Investment Subsidy
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the marginal product of capital rises, and the system converges from B to
where K again equals its equilibrium value. Note that after the first
instant (i.e., after the capital loss) investors always receive a fixed return
p as reduced rents are made up for by capital gains as equilibrium is
restored. The position of the adjustment path depends on the elasticity of
supply of the capital good. IF the elasticity is substantial (the line with
arrows is flatter), adjustment is rapid so that the tax change has little
effect on the asset price of capital. If the SUi of capital is relatively
inelastic, there is a larger movement in the price of capital. In the
limiting case, where the supply of capital is completely inelastic, the
relative price of capital declines to point A along the =0locus.
The effect of a subsidy (raising s)to new capital investment which does
not apply to existing capital, such as accelerated depreciation or the
investment tax credit, is depicted in Figure 4. This shifts the 1< =0
schedule, but has no effect on the return from owning capital and so does not
affect the =0locus. Such a subsidy leads to an increase in long run
capital intensity, but also reduces the market value of existing capital
goods. This illustrates that tax measures that encourage investment may hurt
existing asset holders. The magnitude of the loss will depend upon the
elasticity of the supply of capital. If it is high, owners of existing
capital will suffer a loss close to the subsidy rate. If not, they will
continue to earn rents during the period of transition so the loss will be
smaller.
That a subsidy to capital may hurt capitalists may at first seem
counter-intuitive. It occurs because the subsidy is available only to new-64-
capital which is a perfect substitute for existing capital in this model. The
adverse effect of a reduction in new car prices on used car prices illustrates
the effect considered here.
2.Tax Capitalization in a General Equilibrium Model
This section illustrates how capitalization and changes in factor prices
interact to determine tax incidence in general equilibrium. Consider a tax
on land rents in the simple two period life cycle model presented above, but
altered to include two assets, land and capital, but to exclude population
growth. Such a model is considered by Feldste-in (1977) in his seminal
contribution on the relationship of capitalization to tax incidence. The
lifetime budget constraint (4.1) is unaltered and is duplicated here for
reference.
(4.1) C2t+i =(wt
—Ci)(l+r+1)
The capital stock in period ti-i corresponds to the period t savings of young
workers that -is not invested in land. Letting Pt stand for the price of land
in period t, T for the inelastic stock of land, and K. as above, for the
period t stock of capital, we have that capital per worker in t+1 equals:
(4.23) =— C1t(W,r+1)—
Theproduction function determining output per worker, F(Kt,T,L), is assumed
to be homogeneous of degree one in capital, and inelastically supplied land
and labor. Pretax land rents, corresponding to the marginal product of land,
FTt, are taxed at rate 6. Since land and capital are perfect substitutes, the
return to holding land must equal the return to holding capital:-65-
Fit(1—0) +
—
(4.24) =
Pt
In the steady state we have from (4.24) and (4.23);
FT(l_e)
(4.25) k +r W-C1(W,r), and
ak — p
(4.26) aO/EiO FTKFTFKK
a(A,
1+t—2akak
FK
where r =FK.The above expression is positive (or zero) -if the denominator
is positive, a requirement for steady state stability. Hence, a tax on land
rents raised capital intensity and, therefore, the real wage in the long run.
Theintuition behind this result is that the land rent tax involves a
redistribution from initial elderly landowners to subsequent generations. As
described above such redistribution leads to increased savings. The initial
generation of elderly suffer a windfall loss in their resources because of
the tax on current land rents, and, generally, because of a reduction in the
initial period price of the land. Chamley and Wright (1986) provide an
extensive analysis of the dynamic incidence of the land tax in this type of
model. They show that the initial generation of elderly land owners is always
worse off because of the imposition of the tax. In addition, the initial
price of land can fall by more or less than the present value of future tax
revenues.
Consider, as an illustration of the dynamic incidence of a land rent tax,—66-
the special case in which consumption in periods 1 and 2 are perfect
1 substitutes at rate —; that is:
1 +p
(4.27) U(Cit,C2t) =U(Cit
+C)
The first order conditions for utility maximization imply:
(4.28) r =p
With this preference function first period consumption is perfectly elastic
with respect to the interest rate. Since r is pegged by p, Kt is also
pegged, since p =r
=FK(Xt,T,L)and T and L are given. But pegging Kt means
that W is also pegged. Hence, in (4.23) Kt÷i and W are unaffected by the
land rent tax, and C1 rises by the amount of the decline in PtT. The price of
land can be expressed via (4.24) as the present discount value of the after
tax marginal product of land. Since the marginal products of land and capital
are fixed, we have:
FT(l_O)
(4.29) P = , Vt.
Hence, in response to the introduction of a land rent tax the initial price of
land falls by the present discounted value of all future government tax
receipts. In this case the burden of the future as well as the current tax
rent tax falls entirely on the initial generation of elderly land owners. The
initial young and future generations are unaffected by this tax because the
wage and interest rate they face do not change.—67-
Obviously, this strong result arises because of assumption (4.27). In
what may be the more likely event that both the price of land falls by less
than the present value of future taxes and capital increases over time, the
initial generation of elderly will bear most of the burden of the tax and
future generations will be better off due to the tax. The initial generation
of young workers will, however, bear some fraction of the tax burden, because
the increased capital accumulation will post-date their appearance in the
labor market. Hence, they WIll not enjoy a higher wage and will not be better
off; on the contrary, when this initial young generation is old, it will
receive a lower return on its saving, because the marginal produce of capital
will be lower due to the increase in capital formation. Through this channel
the initial young generation will share some fraction of the burden of the
tax.
In this model, as in others presented in this chapter, the equilibrium
may not be unique. More specifically, for certain combinations of preferences
and production functions there may be an infinity of transition paths for the
capital stock and the price of land, all of which ultimately converge to the
same steady state (Chamley and Wright (1986)). The possibility of multiple
asset price equilibria in models of this kind is discussed more generally by
Calvo (1978). In such settings intertemporal incidence, like other variables
in the economy, are not uniquely determined.-68-
Footnotes
1.The equivalence also holds in a dynamic model provided final output in
theinvestment goods industries is treated as consumption under the
consumption tax and that purchases of newly produced investment goods are not
deductible under the value added tax.
2.ToProvek >k<implies A > usethe two equations A1k + =
- kxjy=1
- K . -
k,and =
k —,wherek ==. Substitutingout for k and some algebra
x y k L
yields the results.
3.Note indicates that A —A >0if k >k.But -0= lx kx y x wx wy
O0- 0 0= ()LL (k —k ). wxrywyrxXV xy y x
4.See Shoven and Whalley (1984) for a description of recently developed
computable general equilibrium models and their methods of solution.
5.This derivative is evaluated at T= 0,and uses the fact that
8C -8Cr8C
_j — 1+ 1rk(1+n) —8r 8w (1+r)
=—kf", and
ac1ac1 8r
8k —8w8k
+8r8k
6.Such swings in saving rates are within the range of U.S. historical
experience, although U.S. saving experience is certainly neither solely nor
primarily a reflection of historical changes in fiscal policy.
7.One perhaps surprising feature of these numbers is that steady state
utility is lower under wage taxation than under income taxation despite an 8
percent increase in capital intensity. Despite the 21 percent greater capital-69-
stock in the wage tax steady state, aggregate steady state consumption is
lower reflecting the smaller aggregate supply of labor induced by the
increased wage tax. While the new steady state has sufficient resources to
sustain a higher level of welfare, the choice between consumption and leisure
is suboptimally skewed towards leisure by the new post—tax intertemporal price
structure imposed by a wage tax. Auerbach, Kotlikoff and Skinner (1983)
demonstrate that for the CES utility function given in (3.40), wage taxation
is less efficient than an income tax over a wide range of parameter values.-70-
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rl=1.0 r=.5
2Sectors 12Sectors 2Sectors 12Sectors
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